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COMMENTS
tations that the desirable and uniform coloring contained in
petitioners' products was the result of superior methods of roast-
ing, painstaking process of selection, and sorting, when in reality
the coloration was produced artificially by iron oxide. Unani-
mous approval of the order was given by the court.
Another disparagement situation is raised in International
Parts Corporation v. Federal Trade Commission.-8 A manufac-
turer of mufflers was ordered to desist from stating that com-
peting mufflers with stop-welded seams were inferior to its own
product or that the use of such competing devices results in
danger of carbon monoxide poisoning. This order was set aside
by the court on the ground that there was no evidence to support
the Commission's finding of untruthfulness. The testimony of
the only witness produced was contrary to the finding of the
Commission.
HORACE G. PEPPER
NECESSITY FOR A BILL OF EXCEPTIONS TO THE OVER-
RULING OF A MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL
In criminal practice there is a generally accepted rule that a
bill of exceptions must be taken to every adverse ruling of the
trial judge, a rule which has been carried to the extent of requir-
ing a bill of exceptions to the overruling of a motion for a new
trial. It is the purpose of this article to point out that such an
extension carries the rule further than is warranted by the rele-
vant articles of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure. It is
the further purpose of this article to indicate a possible solution
to what now constitutes a rather perplexing dilemma.
For a proper understanding of the problem, a brief study of
the history of bills of exception is in order. "Bills of exception
in criminal cases in this state are not of statutory origin. As they
were unknown at common law, which did not allow an appeal in
criminal cases, they were not adopted into our system by the act
of 1805, which adopted the body of common-law procedure in
criminal cases .... They are the growth of jurisprudence, and
prior to the adoption of Act No. 113 of 1896, p. 162, were wholly
dependent upon jurisprudence .... ,,1 Reference to the earlier
78. 133 F.(2d) 883 (C.C.A. 7th, 1943).
1. State v. Stockett, 115 La. 743, 744, 39 So. 1000 (1905).
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case of State v. Nelson 2 discloses the difficulties which had
plagued the courts in the early stages of the development of the
jurisprudence and sheds light on the later "growing pains" of
its evolution. The provision in the Louisiana constitution limiting
the supreme court's appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases to
questions of law alone had given the court considerable difficulty
when the issue before it was a blended one of law and fact. The
court, in the Nelson case, resolved that difficulty by holding that
the constitutional inhibition extended only to those questions of
fact relating to the guilt or innocence of the accused which were
to be decided by the jury and not to those incidental questions of
fact which were to be decided by the judge as a basis for his
rulings of law. Hence, if the trial judge signed a bill of excep-
tions, thereby in effect certifying those facts upon which his rul-
ing was based, the supreme court could review his ruling as a
matter of law. A bill of exceptions was therefore necessary in all
such cases, and in the absence of one the supreme court would
be without power to review the ruling of the trial judge, deny-
ing a motion for a new trial. The motion for new trial in the
Nelson case was based on alleged misconduct of the jury during
its deliberation.3
In the same month as the Nelson case, State v. Given4 was
decided. It affirmed the Nelson case, holding that evidence in-
troduced to show the alleged misconduct of the jury would not
be examined by the supreme court since it had not been em-
bodied in a bill of exceptions. No distinction was made in either
case between the necessity for a bill of exceptions to the purely
incidental rulings which serve as a basis for a motion for a new
trial before the trial court will entertain the motion and the
necessity for a bill of exceptions to the overruling of the motion
for a new trial before an appeal is taken. To put it differently,
no distinction was made between the necessity for a bill of excep-
2. 32 La. Ann. 842 (1880).
3. It is not clear whether defendant's counsel became aware of this
alleged misconduct before or after verdict. Apparently it was after the ver-
dict. Had his discovery been before verdict, it is submitted that the case
might be justified on the basis of the present Art. 502, La. Code of Crim.
Proc. of 1928, i.e., that counsel should have asked for a mistrial, then should
have taken a bill of exceptions to the judge's ruling, his failure to do so
acting as a waiver. If, as apparently was the case here, the information
came to counsel's attention after verdict, obviously he could have made no
objection to the trial judge before verdict. Thus, his only remedy was to
present the evidence to the court in the form of a motion for a new trial,
which was done, a procedure now authorized by Arts. 509 (4) and 514, La.
Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928.
4. 32 La. Ann. 782 (1880).
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tions to an adverse incidental ruling and the necessity for one to
an adverse final judgment. Be that as it may, however, these two
cases served as a foundation for a long line of decisions requiring
bill of exceptions to the overruling of a motion for a new trial.5
In 1928 a Code of Criminal Procedure was adopted, the pur-
pose of which was to clarify and make more orderly the plead-
ings and practices in criminal cases. In the main, it codified the
existing jurisprudence, attempting wherever necessary to recon-
cile and harmonize the conflicting rules to the end that an effi-
cient and logical procedure would be provided. Bills of Excep-
tion, Motions for New Trials, and Appeals were made the sub-
ject of separate and distinct chapters. Though separate, the chap-
ters are related and are in a logical sequence, as even a cursory
examination will reveal. Thus, Article 498, Chapter XXIV, states
that the bill of exceptions is grounded on objections made to the
rulings of the trial court on some purely incidental question aris-
ing during the progress of the cause. In the following chapter,
Chapter XXV, Article 507 requires that every motion for a new
trial specify the grounds upon which the relief is sought. Article
509, of that same chapter, sets forth those grounds, one of which
being that the bills of exception reserved during the trial show
error to the prejudice of the accused. Thus, the trial judge is
given an opportunity to reconsider and to correct any erroneous
rulings he might have made during the heat of the trial, which,
it is submitted, is the primary function of a bill of exceptions.8
If, on the trial of the motion, the judge, having the bill of excep-
tions before him (which presents the objection, the ruling and
the reasons for the ruling) 7 again considers the objection and
persists in maintaining his original position, he will deny the
motion for a new trial and any further bills of exceptions to
that ruling will be merely repetitious of what has already been
presented. The next logical step is to appeal to the supreme
court for a determination as to whether or not the trial judge was
correct. Article 540, Chapter XXVIII, gives to both the state and
the accused the right to appeal from any final prejudicial judg-
5. See infra note 11.
6. "'An exception is an objection formally taken to a decision of the
court on a matter of law .... The office of an exception is to challenge the
correctness of the rulings or decisions of the court promptly when made, to
the end that such rulings or decisions may be corrected by the court itself,
if deemed erroneous, and to lay the foundation for review, if necessary, by
the appropriate, appellate tribunal; ... '" State v. Poole, 156 La. 434, 440,
441, 100 So. 613, 615 (1924).
7. Art. 499, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928.
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ment and, under Article 541 of that same chapter, an order re-
fusing a motion for a new trial is a final judgment.
Reading the various articles together, then, and considering
the sequence of the chapters, the logical inference seems to be
that the redactors intended that where defendant objects to the
ruling of the trial judge on some incidental question, he must
reserve a bill of exceptions. Reservation of the bill would have
a multiple function: it would again call the judge's attention to
the ruling complained of and give him an opportunity to correct
it; it would lay the groundwork for a motion for a new trial in
a case of conviction; and, finally, it would present the issues in
such a form as to enable the appellate court to pass on them in
case a motion for a new trial, based thereon, was denied by the
lower court. If the motion for a new trial is denied, since such
a ruling is a final judgment (rather than an incidental ruling)
defendant is entitled to an appeal.8 This seems to be the view
taken by the court in State v. Soileau,9 as the following state-
ments indicate:
"While Code Cr. Proc. Art. 559, requires as a condition
precedent for an appeal that a motion for a new trial should
have been made and overruled in the trial court, there is no
requirement for the reservation of a bill of exception to the
overruling of the motion. Whatever may be the proper pro-
cedure in the case of new matter set out in the motion for a
new trial, no bill of exception to the overruling of the motion
is required in order to bring up for review on appeal the al-
8. Take a hypothetical case, for instance. D objects to the admission of
certain evidence and the trial judge overrules the objection. D reserves a
bill and has it properly signed by the trial judge. After conviction, D files
a motion for a new trial based on the bill of exception and (since every
motion for a new trial must specify the grounds upon which the relief is
sought-Art. 507) Incorporates therein the bill of exceptions previously re-
served. The judge is, in reality, given two "bites at the cherry," the first
during the heat of the trial when the objection is originally urged and, sec-
ond, when it is again urged as a ground for a new trial. So far as the trial
judge Is concerned, the bill of exception has fulfilled its function. Since, in
effect, it certifies the facts upon which the ruling was based (by virtue of
the judge's signature or per curiam), it is submitted that it also has fulfilled
its function of presenting the issues in such a form as to be reviewed on
appeal. Finally, since the refusal of a motion for a new trial is a final judg-
ment according to Article 541, the next logical step in the procedure is an
appeal. (Of course, in this hypothetical case, if no bill of exception whatever
had been reserved, it would be another matter entirely, but we are here
dealing only with the necessity for a bill of exceptions to the overruling of
the motion for a new trial.)
As to the emphasis herein laid on the distinction between incidental
rulings and final judgments, note the reasoning of Chief Justice O'Niell
(dissenting) in State v. LeBleu, 203 La. 337, 14 So. (2d) 17 (1943).
9. 173 La. 531, 538, 138 So. 92, 94 (1931).
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leged irregularities in the proceedings, reiterated in the mo-
tion, which were objected to at the time of their occurrence
and to the adverse ruling on which objections bills of excep-
tion were reserved."
The precise issue by-passed by the court in the Soileau case was
presented to it in the case of State v. Houck10 in 1942. The su-
preme court there cited State v. Soileau and extended its ruling
to cover the case of new matter (information which came to de-
fendant's attorney after the trial) which formed the basis of a
motion for a new trial. The Houck case is the latest expression
of the Louisiana Supreme Court and should, therefore, carry con-
siderable weight. Unfortunately, however, though citing the
Soileau case, the court made no mention of the long line of de-
cisions holding to the contrary.11
For the reasons previously given, it is submitted that the
Soileau case and the Houck case are logically sound and are in
harmony with the theory of bills of exceptions and in consonance
with the articles of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Yet, how-
ever desirable these decisions may be, the fact remains that they
are directly in the teeth of an imposing array of contrary cases.
It becomes necessary therefore to dispose of these. An examina-
tion of them reveals, several important considerations: many of
these cases were decided before the adoption of the Code of
Criminal Procedure;1 2 of those decided since its adoption, three
cite no authority whatsoever, but which were probably grounded
on the old conception; " and, finally, the remaining case was
10. 199 La. 478, 6 So. (2d) 553 (1942).
11. State v. Nelson, 32 La. Ann. 842 (1880); State v. Givens, 32 La. Ann.
782 (1880); State v. Williams, 35 La. Ann. 742 (1883); State v. Jackson, 35
La. Ann. 769 (1883); State v. Belden, 35 La. Ann. 823 (1883); State v. Corn-
stock, 36 La. Ann. 308 (1884); State v. Vincent, 36 La. Ann. 770 (1884); State
v. Redwine, 37 La. Ann. 780 (1885); State v. Deas, 38 La. Ann. 581 (1886);
State v. Wire, 38 La. Ann. 684 (1886); State v. Darrow, 39 La. Ann. 677
(1887); State v. Brooks, 39 La. Ann. 817 (1887); State v. Waggoner, 39 La.
Ann. 919, 3 So. 119 (1887); State v. Pete, 39 La. Ann. 1095, 3 So. 284 (1887);
State v. McTier, 45 La. Ann. 440, 12 So. 516 (1893); State v. Rodrigues, 45
La. Ann. 1040, 13 So. 802 (1893); State v. Napoleon, 104 La. 164, 28 So. 972
(1900); State v. Pullen, 130 La. 249, 57 So. 906 (1912); State v. Munlin, 133
La. 60, 62 So. 351 (1913); State v. Haynes, 133 La. 671, 63 So. 261 (1913); State
v. Matassa, 138 La. 1079, 71 So. 190 (1916); State v. Smith, 149 La. 700, 90
So. 28 (1921); State v. Sandiford, 149 La. 933, 90 So. 261 (1921); State v.
Smith, 159 La. 768, 106 So. 298 (1925); State v. Louviere, 169 La. 109, 124 So.
188 (1929); State v. Wiggins, 188 La. 64, 175 So. 751 (1937); State v. Odom,
192 La. 257, 187 So. 659 (1939); State v. Carlson, 192 La. 501, 188 So. 155
(1939); State v. Rivers, 193 La. 927, 192 So. 533 (1939).
12. See first twenty-four cases cited supra note 11.
13. State v. Wiggins, 188 La. 64, 175 So. 751 (1937); State v. Odom, 192
La. 257, 187 So. 659 (1939); State v. Rivers, 193 La. 927, 192 So. 533 (1939).
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grounded on cases which do not deal with the necessity for a bill
of exceptions to the overruling of a motion for a new trial.4
Assuming then that the Soileau case and the Houck case are
correct, the attorney is nevertheless left in a rather perplexing
predicament. Because the great numerical weight of authority
is opposed to the Soileau case, he is met with the practical con-
sideration that he must take no chances on uncertain authorities
and should therefore, out of caution, reserve a bill of exceptions
to the overruling of his motion for a new trial. On the other
hand, reservation of the bill entails a certain amount of labor
which is perhaps unnecessary and which, if continued over a
long period of time, might become so accepted a practice that
eventually the courts would refuse to recognize a departure
therefrom. 15
The only logical and practical solution to the problem, there-
14. In State v. Carlson, 192 La. 501, 188 So. 155 (1939), defendant's coun-
sel reserved a bill to the overruling of his motion for a new trial, but did
not prepare a formal bill of exceptions and have it signed by the trial
judge. Citing State v. Barrett, 137 La. 535, 68 So. 945 (1915) and State v.
Snowden, 174 La. 156, 140 So. 9 (1932), the court refused to consider the action
of the trial judge, saying: "Bills of exception must be prepared and presented
to the trial court for its signature and per curiam before an appeal is taken."
Undoubtedly those cases may be correctly cited for that point, but neither
deals with the necessity for a bill of exceptions to an order refusing a motion
for a new trial. In State v. Barrett, supra, four bills of exceptions were
signed by the trial judge after an appeal was taken. Since bills of exception
(where required) must be signed before an appeal is taken (State v. Butler,
137 La. 525, 68 So. 859 [1915]), the supreme court refused to consider them.
In State v. Snowden, State v. Barrett was affirmed on the same point. So,
in the Carlson case, if the basis for defendant's motion for a new trial had
been an objection to an incidental ruling of the trial court, to which an
exception is required, the citations are not only relevant but decisive since,
apparently, no bill of exceptions was signed at any time. On the other hand,
if, as seems to be the case, defendant's motion for a new trial was not based
on an incidental ruling or error, the citations beg the question rather than
answer it. The same might be said for State v. Simmons, 118 La. 22, 42 So.
582 (1906) and State v. Festervand, 189 La. 226, 179 So. 297 (1938), neither
of which dealt with a motion for a new trial or the necessity for a bill of
exceptions to the overruling of it.
15. In defense of the practice, it might be argued that the rule is too
well established to justify a departure at this late date. On the other hand,
the great number of cases thrown out of court for failure to reserve the bill
might well militate against such a conclusion. The supreme court Itself has
recognized the harshness of the rule, in numerous cases of a more serious
nature, by considering the merits of defendant's motion for a new trial even
in the absence of a bill. (See for instance, State v. Hagan, 45 La. Ann. 839
[1893]; State v. Reed, 49 La. Ann. 704, 21 So. 732 [1897]; State v. Michel, 111
La. 434, 35 So. 629 [1904]). And considering bills of exceptions reserved during
the trial (as distinguished from bills of exception taken to the overruling
of the motion for a new trial), the logical effect of which, if sustained, would
be the granting of a new trial. See Infra note 18.
Perhaps the primary justification for the requirement, however, lies in
the difficulty of getting the evidence, Introduced on the hearing of the motion,
before the reviewing court. This problem and Its possible solution will be
discussed at a later point.
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fore. would seem to be in the amendment of the Code of Criminal
Procedure so as to codify the rule of the Soileau and Houck cases.
Such a result might be accomplished by amending Article 498 so
that it would read substantially as follows:
498. Scope of Bill of Exceptions.-The bill of exceptions
is grounded on. the objection made to the ruling of the court
on some purely incidental question arising during the prog-
ress of the cause; and involves the correctness of the conclu-
sions drawn by the court from the facts recited in the bill.
A bill of exceptions is not necessary however when the ruling
complained of is a final judgment, according to the provisions
or Article 541. " 16
Such an amendment would more clearly define the scope of
the bill of exceptions and should restrict its use to adverse rul-
ings on "purely incidental questions." An amendment to that
effect, however, would not in and of itself solve all the difficulties
connected with this issue. There still remains the problem of
getting the evidence, introduced in the motion for a new trial,
before the appellate court in such a form as will enable that court
to pass on it. Where the new trial is asked for on the ground that
the verdict is contrary to the law and evidence, there is no prob-
lem. The supreme court has consistently refused to review the
action of the trial judge in such case since any evidence to be con-
sidered on such motions relates directly to the guilt or innocence
of the accused. 7 Where the motion for a new trial is based upon
bills of exceptions reserved during the trial, the court should find
little difficulty in justifying its review, for such is the function
of a bill of exceptions.' On the other hand, where the motion
for a new trial is based on facts requiring independent evidence,
the difficulty is somewhat greater; yet, it is submitted, the diffi-
culty is not insurmountable. Such facts do not relate to the guilt
or innocence of the accused. They are not facts which are to be
determined by the jury, the jury having in fact been discharged;
and the supreme court has repeatedly maintained its power to
review evidence of that nature."e Even in State v. Nelson the
16. The proposed amendment is in italics.
17. State v. Ricks, 170 La. 507, 128 So. 293 (1930); State v. McKee, 170
La. 630, 128 So. 658 (1930); and innumerable others.
18. See supra note 6. See also State v. Dyer, 154 La. 379, 97 So. 563 (1923);
State v. Robichaux, 165 La. 497, 115 So. 728 (1938); State v. Chretien, 184
La. 739, 167 So. 426 (1936).
19. State v. Hayes, 162 La. 917, 111 So. 327 (1927); State v. Richardson,
175 La. 823, 144 So. 587 (1932); State v. Bridges, 175 La. 872, 144 So. 602 (1932).
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leading case for the proposition that a bill of exceptions is neces-
sary to the overruling of the motion for a new trial, it was said,
"The court has, therefore, authority to consider the facts estab-
lished on a motion for a new trial, when they are such as were
not submitted to and passed upon by the jury, but were con-
sidered and decided by the judge.' 20 The court might therefore
very well take the suggestion made by Chief Justice Merrick in
his dissenting opinion in State v. Brunetto2' where he stated,
"... the motion for a new trial is a part of the record and speaks
for itself. .. ." Thus, where the motion is based on evidence ob-
tained after verdict, Articles 511 and 512 require that an affi-
davit accompany the motion, setting forth in detail the nature of
evidence upon which the motion is based. If the motion is
grounded on errors discovered after verdict, Article 514 requires
that the alleged errors must be specifically and affirmatively
shown. In either of these cases, if, on the hearing of the motion,
evidence should be introduced and recorded, there should be little
reason why the supreme court could not review the ruling of
the trial judge as to said motion, as it does for instance in matters
of prescription, overt acts, et cetera.22
In this connection, however, it might also be necessary to
amend Article 507 in order to give the right to the accused to
have the testimony, introduced on the hearing of the motion,
recorded in a note of evidence, and the right to append such note
of evidence to his motion for a new trial when the question goes
up on appeal in order that the supreme court might have the
whole proceeding before it. To the argument that such an amend-
ment would be in violation of the constitutional limitation of
the court's powers of review, it might be said that the facts do
not relate to the guilt or innocence of the accused and that an
abuse of the trial court's discretion in granting or refusing to
grant a new trial constitutes error, as a matter of law.2 3
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20. 32 La. Ann. 845 (1880). The court adds, however, that such evidence
must be brought up in the proper form, which, according to that decision,
is In a bill of exceptions. Accord: State v. Seiley, 41 La. Ann. 143, 6 So. 571
(1889); State v. Michel, Ill La. 434, 35 So. 629 (1904); State v. Napoleon,
104 La. 164, 28 So. 972 (1900).
21. 13 La. Ann 45, 47 (1858).
22. See supra note 19. But see State v. LeBleu, 203 La. 337, 14 So. (2d)
17 (1943).
23. State v. Nelson, 32 La. Ann. 842, 845 (1880); State v. Bradley, 166 La.
1010, 118 So. 116 (1928).
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